II. The Naval Doctrinal Dilemma
As the 21 st century dawns, what used to be known as amphibious warfare has come under increased scrutiny as the Department of the Navy has slowly shifted its focus from blue water to littoral operations. In the former, the Navy's preeminent operational unit-the numbered fleet-was designed first and foremost to defeat the Soviet naval threat, with amphibious operations in the littorals occupying an important but decidedly subsidiary place in its hierarchy. Absent a significant blue-water threat, this hierarchy has now been turned on its head, The global land/sea interface, with three quarters of the world's population and "nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade," is now the key naval battle space of the 21 st century 1 .
Nearly a decade ago, the naval services signed on to what was at the time expected to be a significant recognition of this great change in naval warfare. In 1992's "...From the Sea" and 1994's "Forward ... from the Sea," the Navy Secretary and the naval service chiefs promoted a corporate vision aimed at achieving the closest operational-level integration of naval warfare within a joint campaign. However, as one author, Captain Sam Tangredi, U.S. Navy, stated in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in late 1999, this naval warfare integration did not occur; in fact, he opined that the Navy and the Marine Corps were further apart at decades' end than in 1992. Captain Tangredi summed up the current status of the Marine Corps-Navy relationship as follows:
The Marine Corps-through the development of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)-is focused on sustained operations of forces on land, but based on and supported from the sea; and the Navy appears merely to have modified its traditional blue-water naval operations so as to be practical within closer range of land. The Tomahawk attacks, carrier wing air strikes, and sanction enforcement operations that have constituted Navy operations in support of land warfare may indeed have a direct influence on events ashore, but none of these functions is fundamentally different-advances in technology aside-from those anticipated in the Cold War-era Maritime Strategy. From this view, it would appear that the Marine Corps is ahead of the Navy in optimizing its organization and doctrine to the new strategic landscape.
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Tangredi acknowledged the Navy's focus on network-centric warfare (NCW), and noted that some in the Navy consider it to be the equivalent of OMFTS. Again, the apparent disconnect between an operational concept that emphasizes the exchange of data in support of long-range power projection and one that emphasizes ship-to-objective maneuver [STOM] leaves the impression of a gap in naval service priorities.
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In that sense, things have never really changed in the warfighting discipline known as amphibious warfare. The "gap in naval service priorities" has always been most evident at the seam between land and sea.
III.
The reassessment on the part of Marines that the commander of an Attack Force needed definite limits on his authority so as to limit unwarranted interference in land operations.
This resulted in an on-the-fly doctrinal revision husbanded by Marine Commandant
Lieutenant General Holcomb and blessed by Admirals Halsey and Nimitz that better defined the relationship between the naval task force commander and the landing force commander as being one between equals, with the latter having unrestricted authority over the landing force once it was established ashore. When the theater commander was satisfied that the weight of effort had shifted landward, he could direct the overall operational commander to shift the operational chain of command to reflect that reality. Marine Division at Inchon in September 1950 was able to accomplish a major strategic purpose in a few days. This brilliant success was due to many factors in addition to the bravery, skill, and combat discipline of the Division itself. There was the mobility of the fleet which assembled and placed it there. There was the skill of the amphibious forces in coping successfully with tides and hydrographic conditions which beggar description. There was the training and know how of the gunners of the naval fire support ships covering the exposed and torturous approach. There was the skill and perception of the carrier pilots who covered the landing area, supported the Marines on the ground with bomb and rocket, and __________________ interdicted the battlefield to the approach of enemy reinforcements. It was the combination of these elements in concert which produced, at Inchon, a strategic reaction exceeding many fold the cumulative or total capabilities possessed by each element of the fleet acting alone.
We Marines were to become aware of this only too keenly in the days which followed.... The fleet, which had performed so brilliantly in September 1950 as a balanced instrument of seapower, had been dispersed by circumstances into separate, relatively ineffective components-of land, sea, and air. 
IV.
An Alternative to Our Present Course: The Expeditionary Warfare Group While defining an amphibious force (AF) as an amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF) together with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations, the consensus position was that …While doctrine should not specify a normal command relationship, typically a support relationship is established between the two commanders based on the complementary, rather than similar nature and capabilities of the ATF and LF. In a crisis scenario, the EWG would hold the ESU out to sea in readiness while the more robust EFU, EMU, and embarked EAU took position closer to the crisis area.
As they are activated, MPF ships would cluster around the ESU, and the MEB offload Expeditionary Warfare Group commander supported by a well-integrated, focused staff will be a factor that multiplies the operational effectiveness of otherwise disparate components.
I propose that an Expeditionary Warfare Group should be commanded by an appropriately qualified naval flag officer, and that the group staff should consist of a balanced team of Navy and Marine officers. EWGs would generally be commanded by
Rear Admirals (Upper Half), most-but not necessarily all-with meaningful "Gator"
time. Marine Brigadier Generals would serve as Deputy Commanders, but an important long-term goal for the Corps that its general officers be philosophically recognized as (1) unrestricted naval officers and (2) qualified to command EWGs. Perhaps to achieve that goal, senior field grade Marines would be required to serve 'integration' tours on amphibious ships in the same manner that Navy pilots do on the path to command at sea. 
VI. Conclusion
Expeditionary warfare in the littorals is a historically complex task. As the Naval Services search for conceptual and doctrinal solutions to the increasing complexity of warfare in this environment, they must come to agreement on expeditionary warfare 
